Spain’s Reluctance to Invest in Defense: Geography, History, Politics and Memory
And a note on Jonathan Powell
1.
The primary and most obvious reason for Spain’s low defense spending is geographic. It occupies most of a peninsula at the western end of Europe, and there’s a big mountain range between it, France and any conceivable overland invasion.
Related to this is that Spain sat out both world wars. There are complex reasons why in both cases and in the Second World War it did send a division to fight alongside the Germans in Russia. Or as Franco would put it, less to fight with the Germans, more to fight against communism. Regardless, it was able to stay out because of the Pyrenees.
The main centre-right party, the PP, is the democratic successor to the Franco regime. It tends to struggle with foreign affairs and the world outside Spain apart from Latin America, where Spanish is spoken and there are business opportunities. Its adventure with the Americans in Iraq was wildly unpopular. It sees Brussels as a place you go to ask for subsidies and Washington as the place that guarantees Spain doesn’t have to worry about defense. It’s Atlanticist but only in a very thin sense. Another reason it doesn’t worry much about defense is that when it’s in government the media regard the nation’s security as being by definition in safe hands, regardless of how little money is spent on the military.
The neo-fascist party Vox in theory favours a mighty Spain again bestriding the world stage like it did in the 17th century. In practice it’s in Putin and Orban’s pocket.
Pedro Sánchez has led Spain since 2018 and he’s managed to drag spending up to about 1.5% now as opposed to less than 1% when the PP left office, mainly by budgetary sleight of hand that didn’t require votes in Congress that he knew he couldn’t win because of the opposition of both his own coalition partners to the left and that of the PP and Vox in opposition.
The left’s root-and-branch opposition to defense spending can’t only be ascribed to a belief that more tanks and fighter jets will lead to fewer schools and hospitals, there’s also a sense of historical bitterness towards the Western allies in it.
When Germany and Italy were defeated in May 1945 the left opposition in exile and the remains of it inside the country were certain that the Franco regime would be the Allies next target. If Mussolini and Hitler, then why not Franco, his regime then at perhaps the height of the mass terror it employed to discipline the population?
To compound the decision by the Western powers to ignore the Franco regime in 1945 the United States signed a defence pact with it in 1953; military and economic aid in exchange for basing rights, a regime up to then no less repressive than Soviet Russia de facto recognized as legitimate.
The enduring memory of that betrayal explains a good deal of the left’s acute hostility to NATO down to the present day. Why believe talk of peace and democracy from powers that propped up a regime that enslaved, imprisoned, and killed tens of thousands of Spaniards after the end of the Civil War?
Sánchez yesterday met the other party leaders to discuss defence spending but given the views of both the opposition and his own coalition partners I don’t think it’ll be possible to do much beyond further off-the-books investments in the defense industry, related research funds and such like.
He’s in Finland today where he suggested that the bulk of the EU’s increased defense resources should go to the frontline states. Perhaps an idea worth thinking about.
2.
Can we please stop with the mad idea that Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair’s Chief of Staff during the talks that led to the Belfast agreement was acting as a mediator at the time? He negotiated with the Provos on behalf of the UK and in pursuit of its aims. The UK was a party to the conflict, not some kindly international arbitrator between warring Irish factions.
In his current role it’s to be hoped that Powell’s not acting as a mediator either but rather seeking to advance the interests of Ukraine.